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An analysis of  how today’s patent law will affect tomorrow’s innovation in three areas of  precision medicine: (1) 
biomarkers and nature-based products; (2) diagnostics; and (3) algorithms, big data, and AI. 
No topic in medicine garners more 
interest today than precision 
medicine, with its goal of  better 
tailoring treatment to patient needs. 
It is not only patients who stand to 
benefit from better diagnosis, 
prognosis and treatment, but also 
the organizations  investing in its 
r e s e a r ch and deve lopmen t1 . 
According to one recent estimate, 
the global precision medicine market 
accounted for $43.59 billion in 2016 
and is expected to reach $141.70 
billion by 2026 with a compound 
annual growth rate of  11.23% 
between 2017 and 20262.  
The commercial viability, and hence 
development, of  precision medicine 
depends in large part on the 
intellectual property framework that 
applies to its various forms. In this 
paper we examine recent patent law 
decisions in the U.S. and Europe and 
their implications for the future of  
three areas of  precision medicine: 
(1) biomarkers and nature-based 
products; (2) diagnostics; and (3) 
algorithms and AI. 
Understanding the three “Precision 
Medicine” Categories 
Before discussing how patent law 
treats these categories, it is useful to 
be more specific about each. 
A b i o m a r ke r i s “ a d e f i n e d 
characteristic that is measured as an 
indicator of  normal biological 
processes, pathogenic processes, or 
responses to an exposure or 
intervention, including therapeutic 
interventions. Molecular, histologic, 
r ad iog raph ic, or phys io log ic 
charac te r i s t i c s a re t ypes o f  
biomarkers” (FDA/NIH BEST)3. 
Examples include a genetic sequence 
or a hormone level. With suitable 
knowledge, comparing a biomarker 
with a baseline measurement enables 
one to predict or diagnose a disease 
state, or choose a better treatment or 
drug dosage. Identifying biomarkers 
relevant at a population level is the 
first challenge, but even more 
difficult is to validate biomarkers 
that are sufficiently accurate and 
precise to be clinically useful in 
individual patients. To date, a large 
number of  potential biomarkers 
have been identified but very few 
have been qualified by the FDA for 
use in clinical trials or entered the 
c l i n i c a s d i a g n o s t i c t o o l s 4 . 
Considerable R&D is still required, 
with associated expense and risk. 
The FDA/NIH BEST (Biomarkers, 
EndpointS, and other Tools) Resource 
provides examples for each category 
of  biomarkers, including diagnostic, 
monitoring, pharmacodynamic/
response, predictive, and prognostic 
biomarkers3. As an example, the 
Oncotype DX is a test based on a 
biomarker which assists doctors in 
d e t e r m i n i n g p r o p e r c a n c e r 
treatment5. 
Precision medicine also builds on 
understandings of  relationships and 
correlations. This requires domain 
knowledge and judgement of  the 
various inputs, outputs, and their 
interaction. To develop clinical-grade 
biomarkers based on relationships 
and correlations requires significant 
R&D, as well as scientific validation 
and r egu l a to r y app r ova l o r 
qualification. Natural relationships, 
correlations and algorithms can be 
used to develop digital biomarkers 
from quantifiable physiological or 
behavioral data collected by means 
of  digital devices such as portables, 
s m a r t p h o n e s , w e a r a b l e s , 
implantables or digestibles to 
explain, guide or predict health-
related outcomes. One example 
involves measurement of  gait and 
balance using wearable technologies 
to  develop monitoring, prognostic 
or therapy response biomarkers, 
which can be used to assess 
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prog ress ion of  neuro log ica l 
dysfunction in Parkinson’s disease 
and other movement disorders6.  
Algorithms, big data, and artificial 
intelligence (AI) in medicine can 
help examine vast amounts of  health 
data, such as the results of  
diagnostic tests, physiologic signals, 
or patient biomarkers, in order to 
m a k e p r e d i c t i o n s a n d 
recommendations tailored to the 
characteristics of  a patient. Some AI 
opera t e s u s ing “b l ack box” 
algorithms, in the sense that some 
aspects of  machine-learning are not 
explicitly articulated, because AI 
results can be generated based on 
implicit correlations within the data, 
as opposed to following a sequence 
of  spec i f i ed s teps or us ing 
fundamental , wel l-understood 
correlations based on domain 
knowledge. In truth it is better to 
think of  this as a spectrum of  
“opacity” of  the “box”7. Medical 
correlations often reflect complex 
interactions of  natural relationships 
at an individual or group level, rather 
than universal natural laws such as 
E=mc2. For instance, the Oncotype 
DX test is considerably more 
specific and correlates various 
biomarkers to create a cancer 
Recurrence Score5. 
Starting first with the US followed 
by Europe, we examine how patent 
law developments in the areas of  
nature-based products (product 
b i o m a r k e r s ) , c o r r e l a t i o n s , 
algorithms, and their underlying 
logic affect  each of  these areas of  
precision medicine. 
Emerging US Case Law 
A. Biomarkers & Correlations 
In 2012, the US Supreme Court held 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v 
Prometheus Laboratories (Mayo) that 
Prometheus’ patents set forth laws 
of  nature and were therefore not 
patentable8. The patent claim at 
issue involved the relationship 
between metabolite concentrations 
in blood and medical predictions 
whether a dosage of  a thiopurine 
drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm. A year later, in 2013, the US 
Supreme Court held in AMP v 
Myriad Genetics (Myriad) that “[a] 
naturally occurring DNA segment is 
a product of  nature and not patent 
eligible merely because it has been 
isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible 
b e c a u s e i t i s n o t n a t u r a l l y 
occurring”9. 
These two US decisions have been 
controversial, and criticised by many 
commentators for undermining 
innovation incentives in precision 
medicine10,11. Some groups have 
been seeking Congressional action12. 
As of  now, the boundaries of  patent 
eligibility remain those set by the 
Supreme Court, which have been 
interpreted and applied by the US 
patent office (USPTO) and lower 
courts. To understand fully the 
implications of  the Supreme Court 
cases for precision medicine, one 
must take account of  the nuance in 
the judges’ reasoning.  
The Court held in Mayo that “if  a 
law of  nature is not patentable, then 
neither is a process reciting a law of  
nature, unless that process has additional 
f eatur es that provide practical 
assurance that the process is more 
than a drafting effort designed to 
monopolize the law of  nature 
itself"8. Thus in order to transform 
an ineligible law of  nature into a 
patent-eligible application, a patent 
must do more than simply state the 
law of  nature while adding the 
words “apply it.” The patent must 
limit its reach to a particular, 
inventive application of  the law. The 
Court’s opinion was that, besides 
simply describing the natural 
relationship between concentrations 
of  thiopurine metabolites and 
optimum dosage, Prometheus’ 
patent claim did not go beyond 
“ w e l l - u n d e r s t o o d , r o u t i n e , 
conventional activity, previously 
engaged in by those in the field”8 
(because clinicians had previously 
tailored dosages of  thiopurine drugs 
for individual patients). In essence, 
the claims were directed to the 
natural law itself.  
B. Algorithms 
Turning to the patentability of  
a l g o r i t h m s a n d c o m p u t e r -
implemented inventions, the US 
Supreme Court held in Alice Corp v 
CLS Bank International (Alice) in 2014 
that “merely requiring generic 
computer implementation fails to 
transform [an] abstract idea into a 
patent-eligible invention”13. The 
patent claimed a method for 
exchanging financial obligations 
(the process of  financial settlement) 
using a third-party intermediary, and 
the computer system to carry out 
the method. The Supreme Court 
held the patent was ineligible, 
applying the two-step test developed 
in Mayo. First, determine whether 
the claims are ‘directed to’ an 
abstract idea (Step 2A). If  so, 
consider whether additional claim 
elements which, individually or as an 
ordered combination, amount to 
‘significantly more’ than the abstract 
idea (Step 2B). That is, ascertain the 
presence of  an ‘inventive concept’ 
which transforms the abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention. The 
Court concluded the claims were 
directed to the abstract idea of  using 
a neutral intermediary to reduce risk 
during the settlement process, and 
that merely implementing the idea 
through a computer did not add 
anything of  substance to the claims 
that would amount to an ‘inventive 
concept.’  
Alice followed several earlier cases, 
including Bilski v Kappos14 where the 
abstract idea of  risk hedging, a 
“fundamental economic practice,” 
was ineligible and using a computer 
to implement the algorithm did not 
change that.  
C. Underlying Concern 
In all of  these cases the Supreme 
Court’s concern was to exclude 
patent applications that unduly ‘pre-
empt ’ f u tu r e i nnova t ion by 
effectively tying up the underlying 
‘abstract idea’, ‘natural law’ or 
‘natural phenomena’ (including 
products of  nature), albeit for the 
limited duration of  the patent. But 
the Court made clear that an 
invention is not ineligible for patent 
protection simply for involving an 
abstract concept or a natural law. 
Applications of  an abstract concept 
(or natural phenomena) “to a new 
and useful end”13 or to solve a 
technological problem, even in 
“conventional industry practice”15, 
are patent eligible. 
This nuance can also be seen in an 
earlier case involving medical device 
technology, In re Abele16. The patent 
concerned the invention of  a 
tomographic scanner. Some claims 
were found ineligible as they were 
directed to the algorithm per se (“the 
algorithm is neither explicitly nor 
implicitly applied to any certain 
process”16), whereas other claims 
were eligible as they were directed to 
the technical application of  the 
algorithm, resulting in “an improved 
C A T- s c a n p r o c e s s . ” 1 6 T h e 
improvement resided “in the 
application of  a mathematical 
formula within the context of  a 
p roce s s wh i ch encompas se s 
s i gn i f i c an t l y more than the 
algorithm alone.”16 
The Supreme Court’s view is that 
pre- or post-solution activities 
included in a claim (i.e., activities 
incidental, nominal or tangential to 
the primary process or product) 
should be scrutinised carefully to 
assess whether the claims genuinely 
amount to ‘significantly more’ than 
ineligible subject matter. After all, a 
“competent draftsman could attach 
some form of  post-solution activity 
to almost any [abstract idea or 
natura l phenomenon]”(MPEP 
§2016.05(g)). Crafty drafting should 
not be allowed to mask pre-emptive 
claims. Otherwise, for instance, 
extra-solution activity such as data 
gathering before performing a 
clinical test, or determining the level 
of  a biomarker in the blood8, or 
assess ing the meaning of  a 
biological test measurement could 
mask an unduly pre-emptive claim 
and allow the patent to tie up a 
natural relationship. 
Impact on Precision Medicine  
The cases of  Myriad, Mayo, and Alice 
affect the patent eligibility of  all 
three broad categories of  inventions 
in precision medicine, namely those 
involving: 1) biomarkers and nature-
based product s (Myr iad ) , 2 ) 
relationships and correlations 
(Mayo), and 3) algorithms and AI 
(Alice). 
Figure 1 shows a summary of  how 
these US cases apply to the three 
categories of  precision medicine, as 
well as the patent eligibility status of  
various types of  inventions within 
each of  these groups. 
Notably, patent subject-matter 
eligibility (35 USC §101) is just one 
of  several criteria that the patent 
app l i ca t ion must meet . The 
invention must also be novel (35 
Figure 1 Application and impact of  emergent patent case law to different categories of  precision medicine, including 
biomarkers, diagnostics, and algorithms/AI. 
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USC §102), non-obvious (35 USC 
§103) and appropriately disclosed 
(35 USC §112). While the initial 
requirement of  subject-matter 
eligibility for precision medicine 
inventions is the focus of  this 
article, inventions that meet this 
hurdle can still be rejected based on 
other criteria, such as not being 
novel or non-obvious in light of  
prior art. 
In the immediate aftermath of  
Myriad, Mayo and Alice there was a 
high degree of  uncertainty as to 
their impact on precision medicine. 
For example, would Myriad affect 
biomarker patents other than 
isolated DNA? Given that precision 
medicine can rely on individual 
responses to particular treatment, 
wo u l d M a y o ’s e xc l u s i o n o f  
relationships and correlations that 
exist “in principle apart from human 
action” drastically limit patent 
protection in this field? Would the 
abstract idea exclusion developed in 
Alice affect the eligibility of  
algorithms for precision medicine?  
Having the benefit of  the latest 
USPTO Examination Guidance 
(MPEP 2106 and January 2019 
Examination Guidance Update17), 
additional decided cases, and 
empirical studies18,19,20,21, it is timely 
to assess the current state of  patent 
eligibility for precision medicine. 
A) Biomarkers & Nature-Based 
Products 
In the case of Myriad, although the 
decision was predicted by some legal 
scholars to be a ‘surgical strike’, 
merely excluding isolated genomic 
DNA from patent eligibility22 
(Figure 1 Type A.1), the case has 
had broader impact20. In fact, our 
prior research estimated that when 
Myriad was cited by examiners as 
grounds for a 35 USC 101 rejection, 
85% of  the cases concern nature-
based product patent claims beyond 
isolated DNA20. The explanation is 
that, over time, the USPTO and 
lower courts have interpreted Myriad 
as a general product of  nature case 
and reconciled it with the two-step 
test adopted in Mayo/Alice.  Thus 
the product of  nature exclusion 
presently affects patent claims that 
‘recite’ a nature-based product (Step 
A), except if  the nature-based 
product is ‘markedly different’ from 
a naturally-occurring product or if  
the claim includes ‘significantly 
more’ (Step B). Accordingly, the 
product of  nature exclusion narrows 
product claims in relation to a wide 
variety of  nature-based biomarkers 
(e.g., proteins, RNA, hormones)20. 
Our previous research also found 
that it has not been easy to draft 
around Myriad. In more than 70% of  
the patent applications examined in 
the 3 years after Myriad, applicants 
responded by cancelling the isolated 
DNA claims or abandoning their 
applications19.  
However, although a broad variety 
of  precision medicine biomarkers 
are harder to patent since Myriad, it 
is not impossible. The Supreme 
Court confirmed that cDNA is 
patentable (provided it is long 
enough to be structurally different 
from naturally occurring gDNA) 
(Figure 1 type A.3). Furthermore, 
our previous research indicates that 
approximately 48% of  patent 
applications have managed to 
advance to allowance after receiving 
a Myriad-based rejection19. Besides 
claiming cDNA, there are at least 
eight types of  amendments that 
have transformed ineligible subject 
matter into patent eligible claims 
(passing the ‘markedly different 
characteristics’ or ‘significantly more’ 
tests (Figure 1 type A.2)19.   
B) Individual Responses & Methods of 
Diagnosis: Natural Relationships & 
Correlations 
The trio of  Supreme Court cases 
has had a particularly strong impact 
on precision medicine inventions 
that rely on relationships and 
correlations to diagnose or target 
treatment to patients. But the 
proverbial pendulum appears to be 
swinging back. How far is presently 
unclear.  
To appreciate the impact, it is useful 
to sub-categorize invention claims as 
follows: 1) methods directed to the 
underlying relationships of  human 
response (these are ineligible), 2) 
methods of  detection or methods 
of  diagnosis (affected by the case 
law; eligibility depends on closer 
analysis of  claims), and 3) methods 
of  treatment (eligible) (Figure 1 
category B). These sub-categories 
concern patent claims directed at 
methods, but may also involve, inter 
alia, diagnostic, prognostic, and 
predictive biomarkers. 
As mentioned, in Mayo, the US 
Supreme Cour t re jec ted the 
eligibility of  a method to optimize 
the dosage of  a thiopurine drug 
relying on a relationship between 
measured levels of  thiopurine 
metabolite and patient response. 
The Court held the relationship 
exists in principle without human 
action (Figure 1 type B.1).  
The Court of  Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion in Sequenom in 201523. A 
patent concerning non-invasive pre-
natal testing, with potentially 
significant implications for screening 
embryos and foetuses for genetic 
conditions24, was ineligible for US 
patent protection. The court 
concluded the patent set forth a 
platform for detecting the natural 
phenomenon o f  f e t a l DNA 
circulating in the mother’s blood and 
did not offer significantly more—
only non-inventive applications of  
circulating fetal DNA in diagnosing 
well-known genetic disorders such 
as Down’s Syndrome (Figure 1 type 
B.1). 
A clear sign of  a less restrictive 
interpretation of  Mayo emerged with 
the decision of  the Court of  
Appeals for the 2018 Federal Circuit 
in Vanda25. The softening in the 
Court’s decision hinged on the 
patent claim being interpreted as a 
method of  treatment claim (Figure 
1 type B.3). The Court held that 
method of  treatment claims involve 
human intervention; accordingly the 
invention is not directed to a natural 
relationship itself  and consequently 
is not directed to an ineligible law of  
nature or natural phenomena.   
The reasoning in Vanda indicated it 
will be significantly easier to 
prosecute a method of  treatment 
claim than methods of  detection or 
diagnosis, even though to some 
e x t e n t a l l i n v o l v e n a t u r a l 
relationships between the human 
body and something else.  Since a 
method of  treatment claim is prima 
facie held ‘not directed to’ an 
ineligible law of  nature, the patent 
applicant does not have to marshal 
arguments to show that the 
application involves ‘significantly 
more’ than a law of  nature. Drafting 
the claim as a method of  medical 
treatment claim circumvents Step 2 
of  the Mayo test.  
In contrast, precision medicine 
innovations that hinge on a method 
of  detection or diagnosis typically 
have to contend with step 2 of  the 
Mayo/Alice test (Figure 1 type B.2). 
Of  these, methods of  detection 
generally have better odds of  
satisfying Steps 2A or 2B of  the 
Mayo/Alice test, provided they 
employ unconventional/non-routine 
techniques.  
Inventions with claims merely 
directed to methods of  diagnosis 
(i.e., those without further human 
action in the form of  a treatment) 
are likely the most difficult to patent 
post-Mayo.  
While the Mayo decision has been 
highly controversial, with some 
arguing it would be disastrous for 
meritorious inventions in the life 
sciences, biotech and precision 
medicine26,27, recent empirical 
studies show that in approximately 
35% of  the cases applicants have 
been able to overcome Mayo-based 
rejections21. It should be noted, 
however, that since Mayo there has a 
been a high degree of  uncertainty 
regarding eligible and ineligible 
inventions. As a consequence, patent 
applications in the field of  precision 
medicine are rejected at a relatively 
high frequency for failing to satisfy 
the patent eligibility test of  35 USC 
§101. In previous research we 
estimated an increase in the numbers 
of  patent applications receiving a 
§101 rejection rising from 10.5% to 
55% in the 6 years following Mayo 
(Art Unit 1634). We also found that 
there was a significant increase in the 
time and expense involved in 
prosecuting a precision medicine 
patent21. After Vanda, it is expected 
that , where poss ib le, patent 
a t t o r n e y s m a y u s e c l a i m 
constructions that more closely 
approximate methods of  treatment 
(Figure 1 type B.3), and the 
rejection rate where examiners cite 
§101 with Mayo will subside to some 
extent. 
In summary, it is still possible 
(provided claims are carefully 
drafted and/or constructed as 
method of  treatment claims) but 
currently challenging, to obtain 
broad US patent protection for 
precision medicine inventions that 
r e l y o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d 
correlations. 
C) Algorithms and AI 
While Alice is often considered a 
decision that affects primarily the 
patentability of  business methods 
and generic abstract ideas, the 
decision also affects computer-
implemented inventions in general, 
and therefore precision medicine 
inventions based on algorithms and 
AI.  
It is possible to distinguish three 
types of  prec is ion medic ine 
inventions in this category, namely, 
those that have been explicitly 
excluded from patent protection, 
those which are not categorically 
excluded but affected by legal 
developments, and those whose 
eligibility has been established by 
r ecen t ca se l aw or spec i f i c 
examination guidance (Figure 1 
category C).  
Within the ineligible category 
(Figure 1 type C.1), one finds 
inventions directed to mathematical 
a lgor i thms and mathematica l 
concepts. It is also likely that 
precision medicine inventions 
directed to methods of  patient 
engagement (participative care) may 
be ineligible, on the basis that they 
are methods of  organizing human 
activity or concepts related to 
managing human behavior (MPEP 
2106). Similarly, expert medical 
systems applying specialist domain 
knowledge to diagnose like a human 
doctor may be deemed ineligible as 
“concepts relating to organizing or 
analyzing information in a way that 
can be performed mentally or is analogous 
to human mental work” (MPEP 2106). 
This exclusion also applies to 
precision medicine inventions 
claimed at a high level of  generality, 
such as the method for diagnosing 
a n a b n o r m a l c o n d i t i o n b y 
performing clinical tests and 
analyzing the results in In re Grams28.  
A s ign i f icant propor t ion of  
precision medicine inventions 
affected by Alice (Figure 1 type C.2) 
are based on algorithms that analyze 
patient data (including physiological 
s ignals) in order to develop 
biomarkers which can be used to 
diagnose or guide individualized 
treatment. Such algorithms can be 
deterministic, statistical, or based on 
artificial intelligence techniques. 
While all these algorithms are 
fundamentally different from a 
technical standpoint, most  of  them 
m a k e u s e o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l 
equations, mathematical algorithms, 
and digital signal processing in some 
form. Accordingly, it is often the 
case that examiners conservatively 
issue §101 Alice-based rejections on 
the basis that the claimed invention 
‘recites’ mathematics and algorithms. 
Furthermore, the inventive concept 
often lies in the algorithm itself  and 
not the hardware (e.g., a new 
algorithm that can be implemented 
in any computing device such as a 
s m a r t p h o n e a n d p r o c e s s e s 
physiologic signals acquired using 
standard sensors). 
The key to eligibility for these 
inventions lies in whether the claims 
s a t i s f y the Mayo/Al i c e t e s t . 
Recognizing the level of  legal 
uncer ta inty sur rounding th is 
framework, in its most recent 
update, the USPTO amended the 
test to help identify ineligible claims 
more accurately and consistently 
(USPTO Eligibility Guidance, Jan 2019 
Update17). Step 2A, which consists of  
identifying whether a claim is 
‘directed to’ an abstract idea, now 
takes a two-prong approach, first 
asking whether the claim ‘recites’ an 
abstract idea (e.g., mathematical 
concept, method of  organising 
human activity, or mental process), 
and if  so, whether the claim as a 
whole incorporates the abstract idea 
into a ‘practical application.’ 
Contrary to previous guidance and 
pract ice, examiners are now 
instructed to give weight to all 
elements of  the claim when 
assessing practical application, 
w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e 
conventional. The ‘significantly 
more’ inquiry of  Step 2B is where 
the additional elements of  the claim 
are examined to identify an inventive 
concept beyond well understood, 
routine, or conventional activity. 
According to the USPTO this 
approach should yield the same 
eligibility outcome as the original 
method, albeit maybe at different 
steps in the Mayo/Alice test.  
Similar to the effect of  Vanda on 
methods of  treatment, the new 
USPTO guidelines open a window 
for precision medicine inventions 
involving algorithms implemented in 
standard hardware to satisfy the 
Mayo/Al i c e tes t a t Step 2A, 
circumventing the ‘significantly 
more’ inquiry, by integrating the 
a l g o r i t h m i n t o a p r a c t i c a l 
application. The courts have 
indicated that some elements do not 
confer pract ica l appl ica t ion , 
i n c l u d i n g m e r e c o m p u t e r 
implementation of  an otherwise 
ineligible abstract idea (Benson29); 
addition of  insignificant extra-
solution activity such as gathering 
input data or outputting results, 
when these are merely a nominal or 
tangential addition to the claim 
(Flook30); nor generally linking the 
abstract idea to a par t icular 
technological environment (Bilski14). 
Conversely, examples of  elements 
that have been considered valid 
‘practical applications’ include: (1) 
improvement to a technology or 
technical field, (2) application of  the 
algorithm to effect a particular 
treatment or prophylaxis for a 
disease or medical condition, and (3) 
use of  a particular machine or 
manufacture that is integral to the 
claim, or (4) transformation of  a 
particular article to a different state 
or thing. The recent cases of  
McRO31, Enfish32 and FairWarning IP, 
LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc.33 (Box 1) 
provide a good illustration of  these 
concepts. 
In situations where a precision 
m e d i c i n e i nve n t i o n c a n b e 
implemented us ing s tandard 
hardware (standard processors, 
standard sensors, standard patient 
monitors, etc) and the inventive 
concept lies primarily with the novel 
algorithm or the specific application 
of  AI techniques to solve a 
particular problem, the claim 
Box 1 Notable Post-Alice Cases
FairWarning, McRO, Enfish
In FairWarning IP, LLC v Iatric Systems, Inc.33, 
the Federal Circuit found a method and 
system of  detecting improper access of  a 
patient’s protected health information in a 
computer environment ineligible as being 
directed to an abstract idea. The Federal 
Circuit explained that the claimed invention 
did no more than collect information 
regarding user access to health records, 
analyzing this log data based on a set of  
rules, and providing notification if  improper 
access is detected.  
The Court likened these claims to those in 
Alice, where the claimed invention essentially 
amounts to using a computer to automate a 
process previously being performed by 
humans. The idea that this produced an 
improvement in a technology field by 
increasing speed was rejected, as the 
improved efficiency arises “from the 
capabilities of  a general-purpose computer, 
rather than the claimed method.”  The 
Court reasoned that in this case, as in Alice, 
“it is [the] incorporation of  a computer, not 
the claimed rule, that purportedly improves 
the existing technological process.”  
In the FairWarning decision, the Federal 
Circuit stressed the difference between the 
claims at hand and those in the previously 
decided cases of  McRO31 and Enfish32. The 
McRO patent claimed a computer automated 
method for animating lip synchronization 
and facial expression of  3D characters. 
Although, like in FairWarning, the method 
involved the use of  specific rules to 
automate a task previously performed by 
humans, the Court emphasized that in the 
case of  McRO the claimed invention 
transformed a process traditionally based on 
subjective rules performed by human 
an ima to r s i n to a s e t o f  spec i f i c 
m a t h e m a t i c a l r u l e s t h a t a l l o w e d 
implementation in a computer. Therefore, 
“it [was] the incorporation of  the claimed 
rules, not the use of  the computer, that 
‘improved [the] existing technological 
process’ ,” and thus constituted an 
improvement in the technology field of  
computer animation. 
The claims in Enfish were directed to a self-
referential table for a computer database. 
Despite being defined in terms of  logical 
structures with no physical components, the 
Federal Circuit found the Enfish claims to be 
“directed to a specific implementation of  a 
solution to a problem in the software arts, 
and thus […] not directed to an abstract 
idea,” but rather an improvement in 
computer technology. The Federal Circuit 
pointed to the difference between the focus 
of  the claims being “on an improvement in 
computers as tools” (Enfish) as opposed to 
“an abstract idea using computers as 
tools” (FairWarning). 
drafting and prosecution strategies 
most likely to be successful are those  
which satisfy the Alice eligibility test 
at Step 2A (i.e., that the claim is not 
‘directed to’ an abstract idea) by 
ensuring that: a) the claim does not 
preempt the use of  the fundamental 
techniques in other application 
domains, b) the invention as claimed 
is not directed to mathematical 
techniques but instead to the 
solution of  a technical problem, and 
c) the claimed invention results in a 
technological improvement in the field of  
precision medicine (improved 
detection, diagnosis, monitoring, 
therapy optimization, etc). A claim-
drafting strategy that focusses on 
Step 2B (“the claim as a whole 
amounts to significantly more than 
the abstract idea”) faces challenges 
if  the invention uses generic 
h a r d w a r e ( e . g . , c o m p u t e r , 
smartphone, wearables, standard 
physiologic sensors).   
The full extent of  Alice's impact 
remains to be studied using the type 
o f  emp i r i c a l me thodo log i e s 
previously employed to analyze 
Myriad18 ,19 ,20 and Mayo21. For 
example, how many applications 
advance to an issued patent 
notwithstanding an initial rejection? 
What sorts of  claim amendments 
assist? How long does patent 
prosecut ion take when Ali c e 
rejections are raised by examiners?  
Even without this evidence, it is 
clear that the Alice decision affects a 
w ide var i e ty of  a lg or i thmic 
developments in precision medicine, 
but not all will be ultimately 
ineligible for patent protection. With 
thoughtful claim drafting and 
prosecution, it is possible to obtain 
patent protection for computer-
implemented precision medicine 
inventions provided that they are 
not claimed at a high level of  
generality28 and the focus of  the 
claim is on the improvement of  a 
technology or technical field rather 
than being either on the algorithm 
per se, or the automation of  a mental 
process for which the computer is 
merely invoked as a tool.    
European Perspective 
Patent law in Europe is organised 
differently, and requires some 
explanation to compare its effects 
on precision medicine with the US. 
The European Patent Convention 
(EPC) is an international treaty, 
which provides harmonized rules 
for the grant of  a bundle of  
European patents designated in EU 
Member States (and a few other 
countries). Like the US, patent 
eligibility is a requirement alongside 
nove l ty, invent ive s tep, and 
disclosure. Table 1 compares the 
two regimes. 
The guiding principle for patent 
eligibility in Europe is found in the 
decisions of  the European Patent 
Office and the Enlarged Board of  
Appeal. The principle is that a 
patent claim is patentable if, 
considered as a whole, it has 
‘technical character’. Technical 
character is assessed without regard 
to prior art, it is not a test of  
technological improvement34. 
This principle has substantially 
affected the interpretation of  the 
Table 1 Comparison of  US and European patent subject-matter eligibility of  precision medicine inventions. 
statutory exclusions that one finds in 
the provisions of  the EPC, namely 
that patents shall not be granted for: 
“discoveries, scientific theories, 
mathematical methods […] methods 
for performing mental acts […] and 
programs for computers […] as 
such” (EPC Art 52(2),(3)) or 
methods of  medical treatment and 
diagnostics methods practised on 
the human body (EPC Art 53(c)).  
A) Biomarkers & Nature-Based 
Products 
Notwithstanding the exclusion of  
discoveries as such since EPC 1973, 
and social opposition to isolated 
DNA sequence patents, the EPO 
developed an approach supportive 
of  biotechnological patents which 
was reflected in the EU Directive of  
98/44/EC, and formally adopted in 
the 2002 EPC Implementing 
Regulations35. Unlike the US, 
biological material including a DNA 
sequence, which is isolated from its 
natural environment or otherwise 
produced by a technical process, is 
eligible for patent protection36. 
Technical character can be conferred 
by a technical effect (e.g., the use of  
the DNA sequence in making a 
polypeptide or gene therapy)37 or 
technical processes used to identify, 
purify, classify, and produce it 
outside a living cell38. 
Consistent with these rules, the 
EPO held that isolated DNA claims 
in Myriad’s European BRCA patents 
and the Howard Florey Institutes 
Relaxin European patents were 
patent el igible in opposit ion 
proceedings in the 2000s39,40.  
In 2017, the patentability of  isolated 
DNA was expressly confirmed by 
the German Federal Court of  Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof), which is 
Germany’s highest court of  i.a. 
patent jurisdiction. This was 
significant, as national courts and 
the EPO are part of  different legal 
orders, and the case followed the US 
Supreme Court decisions. The 
German Court stated that the mere 
disclosure of  a DNA sequence is 
not patentable but the disclosure of  
how to create the sequence through 
a technical process such as isolation 
is, even if  the process is not 
specifically mentioned in the 
claims41. The Court also clarified 
that in Europe and Germany, unlike 
in the US, there is no need to 
identify an inventive concept nor 
‘inventive surplus’ to distinguish a 
patentable invention from an 
unpatentable discovery. 
Comparing the U.S. and European Regimes 
Although patent eligible, the 
E u r o p e a n s y s t e m d o e s n o t 
necessarily provide biomarkers with 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r p a t e n t 
protection than the US. For instance, 
a DNA sequence can lack novelty 
(an issue for Myriad’s European 
BRCA patents) and will often be 
‘obvious’ (e.g. where standard 
techniques of  identification and 
isolation are used). Furthermore 
some EU member states have added 
national legislative rules which state 
that DNA sequence patents are 
limited to the uses disclosed in the 
patent (so-called purpose-limited 
protection)42. This differs from the 
usual rule that a product patent 
covers all uses of  the product 
provided at least one application is 
disclosed. 
B) Individual Responses & Methods of 
Diagnosis: Natural Relationships & 
Correlations 
Despite first appearances, the 
statutory exclusion in EPC Art 53(c) 
for methods of  diagnosis practised 
on the human body has limited 
impact on precision medicine. Since 
it excludes only ‘methods’, patents 
may be obtained for diagnostic 
instruments or medical devices for 
use in such methods. Furthermore, 
the EPO has taken the somewhat 
surprising view that methods of  
diagnosis based on blood, saliva, 
urine, etc. are not excluded, because 
these methods of  diagnosis do not 
take place on the human body, but 
rather in a laboratory using human 
tissue without the patient’s ‘body’ 
being present43. The key question is 
whether the claimed method of  in 
vitro diagnosis has technical character. 
Including a step of  gathering, 
analyzing, or reporting data using an 
apparatus can suffice. For the 
subsequent inventive step enquiry, 
recognizing medical illness or 
abnormalities seems to count as a 
technical purpose44. Putting it 
another way, the steps involved in 
medical diagnosis provide a technical 
solution to a technical problem.     
T he EPO he ld methods of  
diagnosing breast cancer based on 
BRACA sequences were patent 
eligible45. More recently, in 2017, the 
German Bundesgerichtshof, in the 
r e c e p t o r t y r o n k i n a s e c a s e , 
considered whether a method claim 
for detecting a specific variant of  
DNA was patentable. Detection can 
be used to diagnose leukemia. Since 
the detection claim included the 
isolated DNA claims, the Court was 
satisfied the method claims possess 
technical character41. 
The European patent for NIPT, the 
equivalent of  the US patent found 
invalid in Sequenom, was litigated in 
the UK case Illumina Inc v. Premaitha 
Health Plc.46 The defendants argued 
that the claims were invalid because 
they disclosed only the unpatentable 
discovery that paternally inherited 
fetal nucleic acid is detectable in 
pregnant women. In stark contrast 
to the US case, however, the Court 
held the claims were valid, finding 
they included the technical steps of  
creating samples for analysis and 
detecting nucleic acids. 
Comparing the U.S. and European Regimes 
Methods of  detection and diagnosis 
b a s e d o n c o r r e l a t i o n s a n d 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e m o r e 
straightforwardly eligible in Europe 
than the US. New methods of  
treatment in precision medicine are 
patentable in both jurisdictions, but 
claim drafting must be approached 
differently due to the exclusion in 
EPC Article 53(c) for methods of  
medical treatment. In Europe, 
methods of  in vitro diagnosis or 
detection which a doctor uses in 
medical treatment are eligible. Unlike 
the US, it is problematic (not 
helpful) to direct the claim to a 
method of  treatment. 
C) Algorithms and AI 
Although the EPC exc ludes 
mathematical methods (including AI 
methods ) and prog rams for 
computers as such from patent 
protection (EPC Art 52(2)), many of  
the next generation applications in 
precision medicine based on some 
form of  mathematical method, 
algorithm or machine-learning 
method are patent eligible. This is 
because the Art. 52(2) exclusion 
applies only if  a claim is directed to 
a purely abstract mathematical 
method (or AI method) per se and 
the claim does not require any 
technical means (Art 52(3)). 
If  the claim is directed either to a 
method involving the use of  technical 
means (e.g. a computer) or to a device, 
its subject-matter has ‘technical 
character’ as a whole and is thus not 
excluded from eligibility under 
Art.  52(2). The EPO considers a 
patent claim to have the all-
important ‘technical character’ if  the 
claim recites the use of  technical 
means for implementation (e.g., 
i m p l e m e n t i n g a d i s c o v e r y, 
mathematical method, mental acts or 
presentations of  information 
through a general or mini-computer, 
smartphone, tablet, measuring 
device, or computer-readable storage 
mechanism such as a memory 
stick)47. 
A computer-implemented claim can 
have ‘technical character’ by: 1) 
reciting the use of  any other 
technical means for implementation 
(e.g., computer), 2) reciting an 
algorithm that has a technical 
application (the algorithm produces 
a technical effect by serving a 
technical purpose) and/or 3) the 
claim is directed to specific technical 
implementation of  the mathematical 
method and the mathematical 
method is particularly adapted for that 
implementation (Figure 1). 
All of  the following pass the patent 
eligibility threshold if  they are 
implemented by technical means 
(e.g., some kind of  computer): 
m a t h e m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
mathematical algorithms, algorithms 
to collect and store data and for data 
v i s u a l i s a t i o n , d e t e r m i n i s t i c 
algorithms and statistical algorithms. 
In contrast, patent claims are likely 
to fail the EPC's eligibility criteria if  
they recite no more than the use of  
an artificial intelligence model (e.g., a 
neural network), or a computer 
program (in the narrow sense of  a 
sequence of  instructions to be 
executed by a computer). 
A caveat to the principle that 
inc luding a genera l purpose 
computer suff ices to confer 
technical character arises in the case 
of  computer programs, but these are 
very narrowly defined (as ‘a 
sequence of  computer-executable 
instructions specifying a method’), 
and distinguished from computer-
implemented-methods (‘a method 
being actually performed on a 
computer’)48. In the case where the 
claim cannot be characterized as a 
computer-implemented method, but 
instead is a computer program, the 
caveat for eligibility is that there 
must be a ‘fur ther technical 
effect’ (running a computer program 
on a computer does not confer 
technical character and is not 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r e l i g i b i l i t y , 
notwithstanding that electrical 
currents are involved)48. A ‘further 
technical effect' is a technical effect 
going beyond the ‘normal' physical 
interactions between the program 
(software) and the computer 
(hardware) on which it is run. 
Interaction with Inventive Step 
Given that a competent draftsperson 
can usually present a claim as a 
computer-implemented method of  
detection or in vitro diagnosis rather 
than as a ‘computer program’ or 
method of  medical treatment, patent 
eligibility (Art. 52) is not a difficult 
hurdle for computer-implemented 
precision medicine inventions in 
Europe. As already explained, it is 
relatively straightforward for a 
mathematical model, algorithm, or 
machine learning method to be 
eligible for patent protection; the 
claim simply needs to recite the use 
o f  t e c h n i c a l m e a n s o f  
implementation. That said, the 
draftsperson must also consider the 
inventive step inquiry. Passing this 
hurdle can prove challenging, if  
‘technical character’ in the claim is 
achieved solely by reciting a computer 
(or any other technical means for its 
implementation).  
To demonstrate an inventive step to 
satisfy the EPO the claim must 
involve a non-obvious technical 
solution to a technical problem47. To 
establish this, all features that 
contribute to the technical character 
of  the invention are considered. 
Features that fall within Art 52(2) 
categories of  mathematical methods, 
presentations of  information, and 
computer programs can contribute 
t o the a s s e s smen t o f  non -
obviousness45 only if  they contribute 
to the technical character. This limits 
the manner in which algorithms (and 
other Art 52(2) features) can be the 
s e a t o f  t h e n o n - o b v i o u s 
development. 
There are a variety of  situations 
when a new algorithm  contributes 
to the claim’s ‘technical character.’ 
For example the algorithm could 
help produce a ‘technical effect’ that 
serves a technical purpose, either by 
1) its ‘application to a field of  
technology’ and/or 2) ‘by being 
adapted to a specific technical 
implementation.’ 
If  the principles we have articulated 
are followed, many precision 
medicine applications will be 
deemed patent eligible subject 
matter in Europe (Box 2). 
Comparing the U.S. and European Regimes 
Despite multiple relevant legislative 
exclusions, European doctrine on 
patent eligibility of  algorithms and 
machine learning is generous 
compared with the US because, 
generally, claim-drafting strategies 
can be deployed to avoid exclusion 
under EPC Art 52(2)49. 
Demonstrating inventive step, 
relative to the prior art, is the more 
restrictive issue for European patent 
protection of  algorithm-based 
precision medicine inventions. In 
Europe, it is strategic to restrict an 
algorithm-based claim to a specific 
technical application or adapt it for 
specific technical implementation. 
Then the algorithm has ‘technical 
character’ and can be considered as 
part of  the inventive step inquiry to 
support non-obviousness50. Notably 
this tip concords with the guidance 
above for drafting algorithm-based 
claims that meet US patent eligibility 
rules post-Alice in light of  McRO, 
Enflish, and FairWarning.  
Conclusions 
Patent law can be likened to a 
pendulum, seeking an equilibrium 
between competing interests and 
tensions51. Finding a balance in the 
field of  precision medicine is no 
easy feat where there are many 
interests: patients, various kinds of  
healthcare providers and health 
professionals, plus all manner of  
organizations involved in research, 
development and commercialization 
(e.g., small, large, public, private, 
public-private). Arriving at balanced 
principles is particularly difficult 
when patent law principles must not 
discriminate against technologies but 
accommodate also articles of  
manufac tu re , mach ines, and 
compositions based inventions52. So 
it is not surprising that the law on 
patent eligibility oscillates, nor that 
the patenting of  precision medicine 
is complex and uncertain.   
The difficulty with a swinging 
pendulum in law is that, unlike a 
physical pendulum, there is no set 
path or timing. In the aftermath of  
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, the legal 
protection for precision medicine 
inventions faced a high degree of  
uncertainty, as the evolving doctrine 
o f  p a t e n t e l i g i b i l i t y w a s 
reformulated. We are still witnessing 
the effects of  that uncertainty, just 
as we begin to see signs that a new 
era is emerging. Post-Vanda and with 
Andrei Iancu taking over from 
Michelle Lee as the Director of  the 
USPTO, and with patent attorneys 
learning new claiming-drafting 
approaches, the restrictive and 
u n c e r t a i n p a t e n t a b i l i t y o f  
biomarkers, medical correlations and 
algorithms is easing off. In this era, 
other patent doctrines will probably 
come to the fore as key policy levers 
(e.g., non-obviousness). But how, 
when, and to what degree these 
developments will take shape 
remains uncertain. 
In Europe, there has also been some 
sw in g in g o f  t h e p r ove r b i a l 
pendulum for precision medicine 
and patentable subject matter.  The 
swing has not been as wide nor as 
forceful as in the US, thus the law 
has felt more stable; but swing it 
does, nevertheless. Notably the EPC 
and US are swinging to a different 
beat.  Presently the EPC law on 
patentable subject matter is relatively 
generous for precision medicine in 
biomarkers, correlations, in vitro 
methods of  detection and diagnosis, 
and algorithms53. 
A divergence between US and 
European laws pertains to the patent 
subject-matter eligibility of  nature-
based biomarkers. In Europe, 
biomarkers are patent-eligible even 
if  merely isolated from their natural 
environment; whereas in the US 
biomarkers must be markedly 
different from naturally-occurring 
products or the claims must include 
significantly more (which tends to 
narrow the claim). In contrast, we 
seem to be entering a period of  
increasing convergence with respect 
to patentability of  applied algorithms, 
mathematical methods (including 
AI), computer programs, methods 
of  treatment based on biomarkers 
and diagnosis (provided one 
considers the combined effect of  
eligibility and non-obviousness 
inquiries). This convergence is 
particularly noticeable following 
McRO31, Enfish32, and Vanda25 as well 
as recent EPO and USPTO 
Examination Guidelines. 
Box 2 Precision Medicine Examples 
Meeting European Subject Matter 
Eligibility Requirements
As discussed in this article, an Art 52(2) 
type feature can contribute to technical 
character through ‘technical application’ if  
it produces a specific technical effect for a 
technical purpose. The claim must be 
functionally limited to the technical 
purpose, either expressly or implicitly. 
Some examples related to precision 
medicine involving mathematical methods 
and algorithms include (1) providing a 
genotype estimate based on an analysis of  
DNA samples together with a confidence 
interval of  reliability, and (2) providing a 
medical diagnosis by an automated system 
t h a t p r o c e s s e s p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
measurements. Examples in the case of  
artificial intelligence and machine learning 
include (3) the use of  a neural network in 
a heart-monitoring apparatus for the 
purpose of  identifying irregular heartbeats, 
and (4) the use of  machine learning in a 
method to classify types of  irregular 
heartbeats, where generating the training 
set and training the classifier support a 
technical purpose (EPO November 2018 
Examination Guidance). An example in the 
case of  presentations of  information is (5) 
presenting a visual stimulus to a person for 
the purpose of  producing in that person a 
physiological reaction (e.g. involuntary eye 
gaze) which can be measured in the 
context of  assessing a medical condition 
(e.g. brain damage, or vision impairment). 
Additionally, an Art 52(2) type feature can 
contribute to technical character through 
‘technical implementation' if  the claim 
states the Art 52(2) type feature is adapted 
to a specific technical implementation. For 
instance, if  an algorithm is adapted by 
technical considerations to the internal 
functioning of  a computer.   
For methods of  detection, diagnosis 
and treatment, there are still some 
cross-jurisdictional differences, but 
convergence is afoot. In Europe, 
methods of  detection and in vitro 
diagnosis are generally patent 
eligible; a competent draftsperson 
can find language that achieves 
technical character. In the US, these 
methods are still affected by the two 
step Mayo/Alice test, particularly 
methods of  diagnosis. In response, 
and post-Vanda, methods of  medical 
treatment are likely to become the 
c l a i m s d e j o u r f o r m e d i c a l 
correlations and relationships. 
Whereas in Europe, methods of  
medical treatment cannot be claimed 
per se but with appropriate claim-
drafting could be protected as 
applications of  a new method of  
diagnosis, or in the form of  a 
medical kit or device. 
 
As an IP intensive field, a reasonable 
degree of  legal certainty is needed in 
o rde r to p romote r e sea r ch , 
technology-transfer, investment, and 
innovation. These legal principles, 
with their cross-Atlantic similarities 
and differences, and swinging 
n a t u r e s , h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e 
significance for the future of  
precision medicine.  
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